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Edit count of the user (user_editcount ) | 23 |
Name of the user account (user_name ) | 'Dscheinder' |
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Page title without namespace (page_title ) | 'FourQ' |
Full page title (page_prefixedtitle ) | 'FourQ' |
Action (action ) | 'edit' |
Edit summary/reason (summary ) | 'New article on an efficient elliptic curve. Adopted mostly from the original paper.' |
Old content model (old_content_model ) | '' |
New content model (new_content_model ) | 'wikitext' |
Old page wikitext, before the edit (old_wikitext ) | '' |
New page wikitext, after the edit (new_wikitext ) | 'In [[cryptography]], '''FourQ''' is an [[elliptic curve cryptography|elliptic curve]] developed by [[Microsoft Research]]. It is designed for key agreements schemes ([[elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman]]) and digital signatures ([[Schnorr signature|Schnorr]]), and offers about 128 [[Security level|bits of security]].<ref name="4q">{{cite journal |last1=Costello |first1=Craig |last2=Longa |first2=Patrick |title=FourQ: four-dimensional decompositions on a Q-curve over the Mersenne prime |date=2015 |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/565 |accessdate=23 May 2019 }}</ref> It is equipped with a [[reference implementation]] made by the authors of the original paper.<ref name="msf">{{cite web |title=FourQlib |url=https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/fourqlib/ |website=Microsoft Research |accessdate=23 May 2019}}</ref>
Its name is derived from the four dimensional Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone scalar multiplication, which allows high performance calculations.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Longa |first1=Patrick |last2=Sica |first2=Francesco |title=Four-Dimensional Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone Scalar Multiplication |accessdate=23 May 2019 |date=2011 |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/608}}</ref> The curve is defined over a two dimensional [[field extension|extension]] of the [[prime]] field defined by the [[Mersenne prime]] <math>2^{127} - 1</math>.
== History ==
The curve was published in [[2015]] by Craig Costello and Patrick Longa from [[Microsoft Research]] on [[Cryptology ePrint Archive|ePrint]].<ref name="4q"/>
The paper was presented in [[Asiacrypt]] in [[2015]] in [[Auckland]], [[New Zealand]], and consequently a [[reference implementation]] was published on [[Microsoft]]'s website.<ref name="msf"/>
There were some efforts to standardize usage of the curve under [[IETF]]; these efforts were withdrawn in late [[2017]].<ref>{{cite web |title=draft-ladd-cfrg-4q-01 |url=https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ladd-cfrg-4q/ |website=datatracker.ietf.org |accessdate=23 May 2019}}</ref>
== Mathematical Properties ==
The curve is defined by a [[twisted Edwards curve|twisted Edwards equation]]
:<math>-x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d x^2 y^2</math>
<math>d</math> is a non-square in <math>\mathbb{F}_{p^2}</math>, where <math>p</math> is the [[Mersenne prime]] <math>2^{127}-1</math>.
In order to avoid [[Small subgroup confinement attack|small subgroup attacks]]<ref>{{cite journal |last1=van Oorschot |first1=Paul C. |last2=Wiener |first2=Michael J. |title=On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents |journal=Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’96 |date=1996 |pages=332–343 |doi=10.1007/3-540-68339-9_29 |accessdate=23 May 2019 |url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_29 |publisher=Springer Berlin Heidelberg |language=en}}</ref>, all points are verified to lie in an N-[[Torsion subgroup|torsion]] subgroup of the [[elliptic curve]], where N is specified as a 246-bit [[prime]] dividing the [[Order (group theory)|order]] of the group.
The curve is equipped with two nontrivial [[endomorphism]]s: <math>\psi</math> related to the <math>p</math>-power [[Frobenius map]], and <math>\phi</math>, a low degree efficiently computable endomorphism (see [[complex multiplication]]).
== Cryptographic Properties ==
=== Security ===
The currently best known [[discrete logarithm]] attack is the generic [[Pollard's rho algorithm]], requiring about <math>2^{122.5}</math> group operations on average. Therefore it typically belongs to the 128 bit security level.
In order to prevent [[timing attack]]s, all group operations are done in constant time, i.e. without disclosing information about key material.<ref name="4q"/>
=== Efficiency ===
Most cryptographic primitives, and most notably [[Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman|ECDH]], require fast computation of scalar multiplication, i.e. <math>[k]P</math> for a point <math>P</math> on the curve and an integer <math>k</math>.
Since we look at a [[prime]] order [[cyclic group|cyclic]] subgroup, one can write scalars <math>\lambda_\psi, \lambda_\phi</math> such that <math>\psi(P) = [\lambda_\psi]P</math> and <math>\phi(P) = [\lambda_\phi]P</math> for every point <math>P</math> in the N-torsion subgroup.
Hence, for a given <math>k</math> we may write
:<math>k = a_1 + a_2 \lambda_\phi + a_3 \lambda_\psi + a_4 \lambda_\phi\lambda_\psi \pmod N</math>
If we find small <math>a_i</math>, we may compute <math>[k]P</math> quickly by utilizing the implied equation
:<math>[k]P = [a_1]P + [a_2] \phi(P) + [a_3] \psi(P) + [a_4] \phi(\psi(P))</math>
[[Babai rounding]] technique<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Babai |first1=L. |title=On Lovász’ lattice reduction and the nearest lattice point problem |journal=Combinatorica |date=1 March 1986 |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=1–13 |doi=10.1007/BF02579403 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02579403 |accessdate=23 May 2019 |language=en |issn=1439-6912}}</ref> is used to find small <math>a_i</math>. For FourQ it turns that one can guarantee an efficiently computable solution with <math>a_i < 2^{64}</math>.
Moreover, as the [[Characteristic (algebra)|characteristic]] of the field is a [[Mersenne prime]], modulations can be carried efficiently.
Both properties (four dimensional decomposition and Mersenne prime characteristic), alongside usage of fast multiplication formulae ([[Twisted Edwards curve|extended twisted Edwards]] coordinates), make FourQ the currently fastest elliptic curve for the 128 bit security level.
== Uses ==
{{Missing information|section|uses|date=May 2019}}
== See also ==
*[[Elliptic-curve cryptography]]
*[[Curve25519]]
*[[Curve448]]
==External links==
* [https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/fourqlib/ Reference implementation by Microsoft]
== References ==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Elliptic curve cryptography]]' |
Unified diff of changes made by edit (edit_diff ) | '@@ -1,0 +1,56 @@
+In [[cryptography]], '''FourQ''' is an [[elliptic curve cryptography|elliptic curve]] developed by [[Microsoft Research]]. It is designed for key agreements schemes ([[elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman]]) and digital signatures ([[Schnorr signature|Schnorr]]), and offers about 128 [[Security level|bits of security]].<ref name="4q">{{cite journal |last1=Costello |first1=Craig |last2=Longa |first2=Patrick |title=FourQ: four-dimensional decompositions on a Q-curve over the Mersenne prime |date=2015 |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/565 |accessdate=23 May 2019 }}</ref> It is equipped with a [[reference implementation]] made by the authors of the original paper.<ref name="msf">{{cite web |title=FourQlib |url=https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/fourqlib/ |website=Microsoft Research |accessdate=23 May 2019}}</ref>
+
+Its name is derived from the four dimensional Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone scalar multiplication, which allows high performance calculations.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Longa |first1=Patrick |last2=Sica |first2=Francesco |title=Four-Dimensional Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone Scalar Multiplication |accessdate=23 May 2019 |date=2011 |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/608}}</ref> The curve is defined over a two dimensional [[field extension|extension]] of the [[prime]] field defined by the [[Mersenne prime]] <math>2^{127} - 1</math>.
+
+== History ==
+The curve was published in [[2015]] by Craig Costello and Patrick Longa from [[Microsoft Research]] on [[Cryptology ePrint Archive|ePrint]].<ref name="4q"/>
+
+The paper was presented in [[Asiacrypt]] in [[2015]] in [[Auckland]], [[New Zealand]], and consequently a [[reference implementation]] was published on [[Microsoft]]'s website.<ref name="msf"/>
+
+There were some efforts to standardize usage of the curve under [[IETF]]; these efforts were withdrawn in late [[2017]].<ref>{{cite web |title=draft-ladd-cfrg-4q-01 |url=https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ladd-cfrg-4q/ |website=datatracker.ietf.org |accessdate=23 May 2019}}</ref>
+
+== Mathematical Properties ==
+The curve is defined by a [[twisted Edwards curve|twisted Edwards equation]]
+:<math>-x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d x^2 y^2</math>
+<math>d</math> is a non-square in <math>\mathbb{F}_{p^2}</math>, where <math>p</math> is the [[Mersenne prime]] <math>2^{127}-1</math>.
+
+In order to avoid [[Small subgroup confinement attack|small subgroup attacks]]<ref>{{cite journal |last1=van Oorschot |first1=Paul C. |last2=Wiener |first2=Michael J. |title=On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents |journal=Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’96 |date=1996 |pages=332–343 |doi=10.1007/3-540-68339-9_29 |accessdate=23 May 2019 |url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_29 |publisher=Springer Berlin Heidelberg |language=en}}</ref>, all points are verified to lie in an N-[[Torsion subgroup|torsion]] subgroup of the [[elliptic curve]], where N is specified as a 246-bit [[prime]] dividing the [[Order (group theory)|order]] of the group.
+
+The curve is equipped with two nontrivial [[endomorphism]]s: <math>\psi</math> related to the <math>p</math>-power [[Frobenius map]], and <math>\phi</math>, a low degree efficiently computable endomorphism (see [[complex multiplication]]).
+
+== Cryptographic Properties ==
+=== Security ===
+The currently best known [[discrete logarithm]] attack is the generic [[Pollard's rho algorithm]], requiring about <math>2^{122.5}</math> group operations on average. Therefore it typically belongs to the 128 bit security level.
+
+In order to prevent [[timing attack]]s, all group operations are done in constant time, i.e. without disclosing information about key material.<ref name="4q"/>
+
+=== Efficiency ===
+Most cryptographic primitives, and most notably [[Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman|ECDH]], require fast computation of scalar multiplication, i.e. <math>[k]P</math> for a point <math>P</math> on the curve and an integer <math>k</math>.
+
+Since we look at a [[prime]] order [[cyclic group|cyclic]] subgroup, one can write scalars <math>\lambda_\psi, \lambda_\phi</math> such that <math>\psi(P) = [\lambda_\psi]P</math> and <math>\phi(P) = [\lambda_\phi]P</math> for every point <math>P</math> in the N-torsion subgroup.
+
+Hence, for a given <math>k</math> we may write
+:<math>k = a_1 + a_2 \lambda_\phi + a_3 \lambda_\psi + a_4 \lambda_\phi\lambda_\psi \pmod N</math>
+If we find small <math>a_i</math>, we may compute <math>[k]P</math> quickly by utilizing the implied equation
+:<math>[k]P = [a_1]P + [a_2] \phi(P) + [a_3] \psi(P) + [a_4] \phi(\psi(P))</math>
+[[Babai rounding]] technique<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Babai |first1=L. |title=On Lovász’ lattice reduction and the nearest lattice point problem |journal=Combinatorica |date=1 March 1986 |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=1–13 |doi=10.1007/BF02579403 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02579403 |accessdate=23 May 2019 |language=en |issn=1439-6912}}</ref> is used to find small <math>a_i</math>. For FourQ it turns that one can guarantee an efficiently computable solution with <math>a_i < 2^{64}</math>.
+
+Moreover, as the [[Characteristic (algebra)|characteristic]] of the field is a [[Mersenne prime]], modulations can be carried efficiently.
+
+Both properties (four dimensional decomposition and Mersenne prime characteristic), alongside usage of fast multiplication formulae ([[Twisted Edwards curve|extended twisted Edwards]] coordinates), make FourQ the currently fastest elliptic curve for the 128 bit security level.
+
+== Uses ==
+{{Missing information|section|uses|date=May 2019}}
+
+== See also ==
+*[[Elliptic-curve cryptography]]
+*[[Curve25519]]
+*[[Curve448]]
+
+==External links==
+* [https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/fourqlib/ Reference implementation by Microsoft]
+
+== References ==
+{{reflist}}
+
+[[Category:Elliptic curve cryptography]]
' |
New page size (new_size ) | 5808 |
Old page size (old_size ) | 0 |
Size change in edit (edit_delta ) | 5808 |
Lines added in edit (added_lines ) | [
0 => 'In [[cryptography]], '''FourQ''' is an [[elliptic curve cryptography|elliptic curve]] developed by [[Microsoft Research]]. It is designed for key agreements schemes ([[elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman]]) and digital signatures ([[Schnorr signature|Schnorr]]), and offers about 128 [[Security level|bits of security]].<ref name="4q">{{cite journal |last1=Costello |first1=Craig |last2=Longa |first2=Patrick |title=FourQ: four-dimensional decompositions on a Q-curve over the Mersenne prime |date=2015 |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/565 |accessdate=23 May 2019 }}</ref> It is equipped with a [[reference implementation]] made by the authors of the original paper.<ref name="msf">{{cite web |title=FourQlib |url=https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/fourqlib/ |website=Microsoft Research |accessdate=23 May 2019}}</ref>',
1 => false,
2 => 'Its name is derived from the four dimensional Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone scalar multiplication, which allows high performance calculations.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Longa |first1=Patrick |last2=Sica |first2=Francesco |title=Four-Dimensional Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone Scalar Multiplication |accessdate=23 May 2019 |date=2011 |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/608}}</ref> The curve is defined over a two dimensional [[field extension|extension]] of the [[prime]] field defined by the [[Mersenne prime]] <math>2^{127} - 1</math>.',
3 => false,
4 => '== History ==',
5 => 'The curve was published in [[2015]] by Craig Costello and Patrick Longa from [[Microsoft Research]] on [[Cryptology ePrint Archive|ePrint]].<ref name="4q"/>',
6 => false,
7 => 'The paper was presented in [[Asiacrypt]] in [[2015]] in [[Auckland]], [[New Zealand]], and consequently a [[reference implementation]] was published on [[Microsoft]]'s website.<ref name="msf"/>',
8 => false,
9 => 'There were some efforts to standardize usage of the curve under [[IETF]]; these efforts were withdrawn in late [[2017]].<ref>{{cite web |title=draft-ladd-cfrg-4q-01 |url=https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ladd-cfrg-4q/ |website=datatracker.ietf.org |accessdate=23 May 2019}}</ref>',
10 => false,
11 => '== Mathematical Properties ==',
12 => 'The curve is defined by a [[twisted Edwards curve|twisted Edwards equation]]',
13 => ':<math>-x^2 + y^2 = 1 + d x^2 y^2</math>',
14 => '<math>d</math> is a non-square in <math>\mathbb{F}_{p^2}</math>, where <math>p</math> is the [[Mersenne prime]] <math>2^{127}-1</math>.',
15 => false,
16 => 'In order to avoid [[Small subgroup confinement attack|small subgroup attacks]]<ref>{{cite journal |last1=van Oorschot |first1=Paul C. |last2=Wiener |first2=Michael J. |title=On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents |journal=Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’96 |date=1996 |pages=332–343 |doi=10.1007/3-540-68339-9_29 |accessdate=23 May 2019 |url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_29 |publisher=Springer Berlin Heidelberg |language=en}}</ref>, all points are verified to lie in an N-[[Torsion subgroup|torsion]] subgroup of the [[elliptic curve]], where N is specified as a 246-bit [[prime]] dividing the [[Order (group theory)|order]] of the group.',
17 => false,
18 => 'The curve is equipped with two nontrivial [[endomorphism]]s: <math>\psi</math> related to the <math>p</math>-power [[Frobenius map]], and <math>\phi</math>, a low degree efficiently computable endomorphism (see [[complex multiplication]]).',
19 => false,
20 => '== Cryptographic Properties ==',
21 => '=== Security ===',
22 => 'The currently best known [[discrete logarithm]] attack is the generic [[Pollard's rho algorithm]], requiring about <math>2^{122.5}</math> group operations on average. Therefore it typically belongs to the 128 bit security level.',
23 => false,
24 => 'In order to prevent [[timing attack]]s, all group operations are done in constant time, i.e. without disclosing information about key material.<ref name="4q"/>',
25 => false,
26 => '=== Efficiency ===',
27 => 'Most cryptographic primitives, and most notably [[Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman|ECDH]], require fast computation of scalar multiplication, i.e. <math>[k]P</math> for a point <math>P</math> on the curve and an integer <math>k</math>.',
28 => false,
29 => 'Since we look at a [[prime]] order [[cyclic group|cyclic]] subgroup, one can write scalars <math>\lambda_\psi, \lambda_\phi</math> such that <math>\psi(P) = [\lambda_\psi]P</math> and <math>\phi(P) = [\lambda_\phi]P</math> for every point <math>P</math> in the N-torsion subgroup.',
30 => false,
31 => 'Hence, for a given <math>k</math> we may write',
32 => ':<math>k = a_1 + a_2 \lambda_\phi + a_3 \lambda_\psi + a_4 \lambda_\phi\lambda_\psi \pmod N</math>',
33 => 'If we find small <math>a_i</math>, we may compute <math>[k]P</math> quickly by utilizing the implied equation',
34 => ':<math>[k]P = [a_1]P + [a_2] \phi(P) + [a_3] \psi(P) + [a_4] \phi(\psi(P))</math>',
35 => '[[Babai rounding]] technique<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Babai |first1=L. |title=On Lovász’ lattice reduction and the nearest lattice point problem |journal=Combinatorica |date=1 March 1986 |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=1–13 |doi=10.1007/BF02579403 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02579403 |accessdate=23 May 2019 |language=en |issn=1439-6912}}</ref> is used to find small <math>a_i</math>. For FourQ it turns that one can guarantee an efficiently computable solution with <math>a_i < 2^{64}</math>.',
36 => false,
37 => 'Moreover, as the [[Characteristic (algebra)|characteristic]] of the field is a [[Mersenne prime]], modulations can be carried efficiently.',
38 => false,
39 => 'Both properties (four dimensional decomposition and Mersenne prime characteristic), alongside usage of fast multiplication formulae ([[Twisted Edwards curve|extended twisted Edwards]] coordinates), make FourQ the currently fastest elliptic curve for the 128 bit security level.',
40 => false,
41 => '== Uses ==',
42 => '{{Missing information|section|uses|date=May 2019}}',
43 => false,
44 => '== See also ==',
45 => '*[[Elliptic-curve cryptography]]',
46 => '*[[Curve25519]]',
47 => '*[[Curve448]]',
48 => false,
49 => '==External links==',
50 => '* [https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/fourqlib/ Reference implementation by Microsoft]',
51 => false,
52 => '== References ==',
53 => '{{reflist}}',
54 => false,
55 => '[[Category:Elliptic curve cryptography]]'
] |
Lines removed in edit (removed_lines ) | [] |
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Unix timestamp of change (timestamp ) | 1558617641 |