Novel Coronavirus Expert Meeting: Difference between revisions
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=== Three C's === |
=== Three C's === |
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The Expert Meeting analyzed the outbreak from [[Wuhan]], which became the first wave of COVID-19 in Japan, and discovered the conditions under which clusters occur, "{{nihongo|Three C's|3密|San Mitsu}}." The first strategy they hammered out was to avoid places of "Three C's (Closed spaces, Crowded spaces and Close-contact settings)."<ref name="nhk20200414"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-22/did-japan-just-beat-the-virus-without-lockdowns-or-mass-testing|title=Did Japan Just Beat the Virus Without Lockdowns or Mass Testing?|date=23 May 2020 |website=Bloomberg|language=en|access-date= 30 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="nhkcoronavirus03">{{cite web|url= https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/coronavirus/view/detail/detail_03.html|title=「3つの条件の重なりを避けて」 専門家会議が見解|date=9 March 2020|website= 特設サイト 新型コロナウイルス|publisher=NHK|language=ja|access-date= 30 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref> |
The Expert Meeting analyzed the outbreak from [[Wuhan]], which became the first wave of COVID-19 in Japan, and discovered the conditions under which clusters occur, "{{nihongo|Three C's|3密|San Mitsu}}." The first strategy they hammered out was to avoid places of "Three C's (Closed spaces, Crowded spaces and Close-contact settings)."<ref name="nhk20200414"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-22/did-japan-just-beat-the-virus-without-lockdowns-or-mass-testing|title=Did Japan Just Beat the Virus Without Lockdowns or Mass Testing?|date=23 May 2020 |website=Bloomberg|language=en|access-date= 30 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="nhkcoronavirus03">{{cite web|url= https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/coronavirus/view/detail/detail_03.html|title=「3つの条件の重なりを避けて」 専門家会議が見解|date=9 March 2020|website= 特設サイト 新型コロナウイルス|publisher=NHK|language=ja|access-date= 30 May 2020|url-status=live}}</ref> The main routes of infection were considered to be "contact infection", which is transmitted by touching a substance to which the virus is attached, and "droplet infection", which is transmitted by inhaling droplets from a sneeze or cough. However, it has been pointed out that the possibility of "micro droplet infection" is pointed out as a new infection route. A small particle of less than 10 micrometers in diameter containing the virus, a micro-spray floats in the air for 20 minutes, and the infection spreads by people nearby sucking it in.<ref name="nhk20200326"/> |
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=== Cluster surveillance === |
=== Cluster surveillance === |
Revision as of 15:11, 31 May 2020
Novel Coronavirus Expert Meeting (新型コロナウイルス感染症対策専門家会議, Shingata Korona Uirusu Kansenshō Taisaku Senmonka Kaigi) is a Japanese advisory body established in the New Coronavirus Infectious Diseases Control Headquarters of the Japanese Cabinet.[1]
Background
It was established on February 14 to advise the Cabinet of Japan from a medical point of view, following the first confirmed Covid-19 death in Japan.[1][2]
Takaji Wakita, Director of the National Institute of Infectious Diseases, chairs the Expert Meeting and Shigeru Omi who was instrumental in SARS measures as director of WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific and later worked to respond to the 2009 swine flu pandemic in Japan is a vice chairman. The members are composed of Prof. Hitoshi Oshitani, who is the leader of the Cluster Measures Team and remedied the situation in the SARS outbreak as an infectious disease advisor at WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific, and others.[3][4][5]
Japan's Strategy for Covid-19
The aim of the Expert Meeting is to curb the pandemic while maintaining socio-economic activities. If countries around the world repeatedly block the city and lift the blockade every time an outbreak occurs, the global economy and society will collapse. They think that urban blockade is a 19th-century measure, and that there is a 21st-century-type measure to curb the spread of infection by controlling the behavior of people.[3][6]
Vaccine development takes time, and we don't know if we can actually make a vaccine. Herd immunity cannot be achieved unless a large number of victims are killed and about 70% of the population is infected.[7]
There were three pillars of basic strategy that they chose. (1) Early detection of clusters (a group of infected people). (2) Strengthening the medical system. (3) Changing people's behavior.[7]
Three C's
The Expert Meeting analyzed the outbreak from Wuhan, which became the first wave of COVID-19 in Japan, and discovered the conditions under which clusters occur, "Three C's (3密, San Mitsu)." The first strategy they hammered out was to avoid places of "Three C's (Closed spaces, Crowded spaces and Close-contact settings)."[3][8][9] The main routes of infection were considered to be "contact infection", which is transmitted by touching a substance to which the virus is attached, and "droplet infection", which is transmitted by inhaling droplets from a sneeze or cough. However, it has been pointed out that the possibility of "micro droplet infection" is pointed out as a new infection route. A small particle of less than 10 micrometers in diameter containing the virus, a micro-spray floats in the air for 20 minutes, and the infection spreads by people nearby sucking it in.[7]
Cluster surveillance
One of the features of the measures for the new coronavirus in Japan is the strategy of cluster surveillance. Japan has deterred outbreaks through epidemiological surveys centered on cluster surveillance.[6][4][10]
In early February, Oshitani and Hiroshi Nishiura, a members of the Cluster Measures Team, found that 80% of patients did not infect others with the coronavirus, but certain patients infected many people, by analyzing the data of the first wave from China. The Expert Meeting set their eyes on that, they decided to prevent outbreaks by tracking infected people and testing those who were in close contact with them.[3][4][6][7][11] If the number of positives is small, it is possible to suppress the spread of infection by tracking the cluster, and it is possible to continue the infectious disease measures while maintaining a constant economic activity.[4]
When the infection rate is very low, the infection will not spread by testing only high-risk people. PCR tests cause false positives, so many tests at low infection rates can even cause false positives to outnumber true positives. They took that strategy with that in mind.[10]
Behind that was the fact that the medical resources in Japan were vulnerable. Unlike other Asian countries, Japan was not well prepared to test for infectious diseases because SARS did not land. The new coronavirus became a designated infectious disease, so those who tested positive were required to be hospitalized even for mild cases, and there were few sickbeds.[4]
However, they also thought that it was a big problem that the number of PCR tests did not increase in the rapid increase of the infected person, and they have gradually increased the number of PCR tests since mid-March.[3][10]
The strategy worked well until mid-March, and it succeeded in preventing the first wave from China, but the second wave via returnees from Europe and the US could not be stopped, and the outbreak occuared in April. That was revealed in May by a genomic molecular epidemiology survey of the new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2).[3][12]
Changing people's behavior
The outbreak occurred in April, and the government declared a "statement of emergency" and asked people to quarantine themselves. The Expert Meeting asked people to “reduce contact between people by 80% more than usual” in order to reduce the rate of increase in the number of infected people and allow cluster surveillance again. When the government lifted the state of emergency in May, they then proposed "new lifestyle" for people.[3][13][14][15]
Criticism
The Expert Meeting and the Abe Cabinet have been exposed to harsh criticism by the Japanese media and their pundits.[16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25]
Under that influence, japanese people also cast a stern eye toward the Abe Cabinet. According to a public‐opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun in May, the cabinet approval rating has dropped to its lowest level since its inception.[26][27][28]
The Expert Meeting was also subject to criticism. Some people held them accountable for the delay in the measures, the lack of PCR tests, and other factors.[17][29] In question-and-answer sessions at the Upper House Budget Committee, Omi, the deputy chairman, was criticized for the small number of PCR tests and was blamed by opposition lawmakers for stating that no one knew the actual total number of people infected.[30][31]
Not only in Japan but also abroad, especially in the US, UK and China, have criticized them.[16][32][33]
There has been a flood of criticism from both home and abroad about the Expert Meeting and the government's response to the Diamond Princess.[34]
The U.S. and Chinese media developed The Olympics Conspiracy Theory, claiming that the Abe Cabinet took part in the plot to make the number of infected people appear less than the actual number until just before the decision to postpone the Olympics.[21][23][32] ABC-TV quoted a Japanese professor Koichi Nakano's contribution as a side note, and wondered, "Why did the number of infected people suddenly increase in Japan as soon as it was postponed?"[16][25] That was later judged to be fake news by fact-checking in several media.[35][36]
The composition of the Expert Meeting
The Expert Meeting is composed of experts in infectious diseases, public health and virology, and lawyer. The standing members are as follows. However, the chairman may request the attendance of other parties as necessary.[1]
The chairman
- Takaji Wakita (Director, National Institute of Infectious Diseases)
The deputy chairman
- Shigeru Omi (Chairman of the Japan Community Health care Organization, and President of the Advisory Committee on the Basic Action Policy)
Members
- Satoshi Kamayachi (Executive Director, Japan Medical Association)
- Akihiko Kawana (Professor, Department of Medical Education, National Defense Medical College)
- Yoshihiro Kawaoka (Director, International Research Center for Infectious Diseases, The Institute of Medical Science, University of Tokyo)
- Kaori Muto (Professor, Institute of Medical Science, University of Tokyo)
- Hitomi Nakayama (Lawyer, Kasumigaseki-Sogo Law Office)
- Nobuhiko Okabe (Director, Kawasaki City Institute of Health and Safety)
- Hitoshi Oshitani (Professor, Graduate School of Medicine, Tohoku University)
- Motoi Suzuki (Director, Center for Infectious Disease Epidemiology, National Institute of Infectious Diseases)
- Kazuhiro Tateda (Professor, School of Medicine, Toho University)
- Masaki Yoshida (Professor, Jikei University School of Medicine)
References
- ^ a b c "新型コロナウイルス感染症対策専門家会議の開催について" (PDF). 首相官邸 (Prime Minister's Office of Japan) (in Japanese). 15 April 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "新型コロナ抑止、専門家会議設置へ". 読売新聞 (in Japanese). 15 February 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b c d e f g "「新型コロナウイルス感染拡大阻止 最前線からの報告". NHK (in Japanese). 15 April 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b c d e "新型コロナ対策における専門家と政治の関係". GLOBE+ (in Japanese). 朝日新聞. 28 April 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "WHOでSARS対策に奔走した第一人者が新型肺炎を語る" (in Japanese). 日経ビジネス. 31 January 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b c "新型コロナ座談会 連鎖断てるか、この1~2週が正念場" (in Japanese). 日本経済新聞. 27 February 2020. Retrieved 29 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b c d "専門家に聞く"新型コロナウイルス"との闘い方と対策". NHK (in Japanese). 27 March 2020. Retrieved 27 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "Did Japan Just Beat the Virus Without Lockdowns or Mass Testing?". Bloomberg. 23 May 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b c "日医が医学有識者会議設立". m3.com (in Japanese). 19 April 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "第1波は終息するも欧米からの帰国者経由の第2波が拡大". 日経メディカル (in Japanese). 12 May 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "新型コロナウイルス 感染爆発をどう防ぐか". NHK (in Japanese). 8 April 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "新型コロナウイルスを想定した「新しい生活様式」を公表しました". 厚生労働省 (in Japanese). 15 April 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "Tokyo lifts state of emergency, braces for 'new lifestyle' with the virus". Washington Post. May 25, 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b c "日本貶める英米系リベラルメディアの偏見". SankeiBiz (in Japanese). 25 May 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b "コロナ専門家会議"議事録なし"、野党「検証できない」批判強める". TBS (in Japanese). 29 May 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "PCR検査拡大は急務". 赤旗 (in Japanese). Japanese Communist Party. 26 April 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "新型コロナ、安倍政権と専門家会議の「いびつな関係」". 現代ビジネス (in Japanese). May 12, 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b "国際比較で最下位の日本のコロナ対策 韓国や中国も対策が奏功し自粛緩和の一方、日本がいまだに自粛続く根本的原因". ビジネスジャーナル (in Japanese). サイゾー. May 19, 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "国民の命を守るため、安倍内閣総辞職を" (in Japanese). Yahoo!ニュース. February 14, 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b "新型肺炎「日本は五輪のため感染者を少なく見せようとしている」PCR検査を巡る陰謀論に与するな" (in Japanese). 東洋経済. February 27, 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "上智大教授の「新型コロナへの対応は無能」寄稿 外務報道官が反論". SankeiBiz (in Japanese). 3 March 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b "Japan Can't Handle the Coronavirus. Can It Host the Olympics?". New York Times. 26 February 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "内閣支持率29%、発足以来最低に". Asahi Shimbun (in Japanese). 24 May 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "内閣支持率27%に急落". Mainichi Shimbun (in Japanese). 23 May 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "共同世論調査、安倍内閣支持率は39%". 共同通信 (in Japanese). 31 May 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "専門家会議への責任追及はお門違い" (in Japanese). 日経ビジネス. May 14, 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "実際の感染者数「10倍か15倍か20倍か、誰にも分からない」…専門家会議の尾身氏" (in Japanese). 東洋経済. May 12, 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "国会でコロナの今後と安倍首相「休校」の是非を聞かれた専門家2人の立場と葛藤 尾身氏×上氏の濃密2時間" (in Japanese). FNNプライム. March 11, 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ a b "Why Trash-Talk Japan and Feed the NYT's Blatantly Racist Editorializing?". JAPAN Forward. 産経新聞. 19 May 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "Japan's coronavirus infection rate could be 'tip of the iceberg' as experts call for more testing". CNN (in Japanese). 5 March 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "「ダイヤモンド・プリンセス」の日本政府の対応に海外から厳しい視線" (in Japanese). TOKYO HEADLINE. May 4, 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "新型コロナ「五輪延期後に検査急増」は本当か 「感染隠蔽」説を検証すると…" (in Japanese). 毎日新聞. 28 March 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "「五輪延期決定で検査を抑制する必要がなくなった」は誤り。検査人数が変動した事実はなし" (in Japanese). BuzzFeed News. 31 March 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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