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This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s ..."
This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s ..."
To Y, which is: "In addition, the Israeli government rejected any possible agreement with Palestine as long as it refuses to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
To Y, which is: "In addition, the Israeli government rejected any possible agreement with Palestine as long as it refuses to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

Referring to the issue of recognizing the Jewishness of the State of Israel following Netanyahu's "Bar-Ilan Speech," Abu Mazen warned against presenting a condition for recognizing Israel's Jewish character on the part of the Palestinians. He expressed concern over Netanyahu’s approach of setting "obstructive conditions" (" شروط تعجيزية") of this kind, "which have no basis in the sources of peace authority or international decisions. Although we have already recognized the State of Israel, the demand that we recognize it as a Jewish state is a precondition that cannot be accepted." Abu Mazen explained that accepting the demand would fuel the religious dimension of the conflict (in his words, turn it into a "destructive religious conflict") and endanger the future of Arab Israelis. It also contradicts the logic by which Palestinians receive compensation for the refugee situation. In interviews conducted in 2012 and 2013, Abu Mazen explained that the question of the state's Jewishness is not a matter for the Palestinians, as they are indifferent to how the Jews define their state, and that this is a new condition introduced by Israel.
Referring to the issue of recognizing the Jewishness of the State of Israel following Netanyahu's "Bar-Ilan Speech," Abu Mazen warned against presenting a condition for recognizing Israel's Jewish character on the part of the Palestinians. He expressed concern over Netanyahu’s approach of setting "obstructive conditions" ("شروط تعجيزية") of this kind, "which have no basis in the sources of peace authority or international decisions. Although we have already recognized the State of Israel, the demand that we recognize it as a Jewish state is a precondition that cannot be accepted." Abu Mazen explained that accepting the demand would fuel the religious dimension of the conflict (in his words, turn it into a "destructive religious conflict") and endanger the future of Arab Israelis. It also contradicts the logic by which Palestinians receive compensation for the refugee situation. In interviews conducted in 2012 and 2013, Abu Mazen explained that the question of the state's Jewishness is not a matter for the Palestinians, as they are indifferent to how the Jews define their state, and that this is a new condition introduced by Israel.
Some argue that the demand for Abu Mazen to recognize Israel as a Jewish state was a "ploy" introduced into the negotiations to sabotage them. Conflict researchers Matti Steinberg and Shaul Arieli explain that this is a demand that is not accepted in international relations, as countries do not typically "recognize" the national character of other countries. They add that there was a legitimate concern on the Palestinian side that the demand could be used to discriminate against Arabs who are Israeli citizens, and that it was perceived as a demand intended to humiliate Abbas. Additionally, Steinberg explains that this demand is absent from the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Jordan, from the negotiations with Syria, and even from the Abraham Accords. Steinberg further explains that from a historical perspective, this is also the traditional position of the right-wing camp in Israel. He cites, for example, Menachem Begin's words (first Israeli Prime Minister from Likud party) in his first speech in the Knesset as Prime Minister, where he said, "We do not expect anyone to request on our behalf that our right to exist in our ancestral homeland be recognized. The only recognition necessary between us and our neighbors is recognition of sovereignty and the mutual need for peaceful and understanding lives." He also mentions Ze'ev Jabotinsky’s stance in his testimony before the Peel Commission: "I do not believe it is desirable for any state’s constitution to contain special clauses that preemptively guarantee its 'national' character... When I use the term 'Hebrew state,' I mean a community or a stretch of land enjoying a sufficient degree of self-governance... and in which there is a Jewish majority."
Some argue that the demand for Abu Mazen to recognize Israel as a Jewish state was a "ploy" introduced into the negotiations to sabotage them. Conflict researchers Matti Steinberg and Shaul Arieli explain that this is a demand that is not accepted in international relations, as countries do not typically "recognize" the national character of other countries. They add that there was a legitimate concern on the Palestinian side that the demand could be used to discriminate against Arabs who are Israeli citizens, and that it was perceived as a demand intended to humiliate Abbas. Additionally, Steinberg explains that this demand is absent from the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Jordan, from the negotiations with Syria, and even from the Abraham Accords. Steinberg further explains that from a historical perspective, this is also the traditional position of the right-wing camp in Israel. He cites, for example, Menachem Begin's words (first Israeli Prime Minister from Likud party) in his first speech in the Knesset as Prime Minister, where he said, "We do not expect anyone to request on our behalf that our right to exist in our ancestral homeland be recognized. The only recognition necessary between us and our neighbors is recognition of sovereignty and the mutual need for peaceful and understanding lives." He also mentions Ze'ev Jabotinsky’s stance in his testimony before the Peel Commission: "I do not believe it is desirable for any state’s constitution to contain special clauses that preemptively guarantee its 'national' character... When I use the term 'Hebrew state,' I mean a community or a stretch of land enjoying a sufficient degree of self-governance... and in which there is a Jewish majority."
This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s ..."
This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s ..."

Revision as of 06:37, 26 September 2024


Olmert and the 2008 proposal

there seems to be very little here, or anywhere on wikipedia, on Ehud Olmert's peace talks, particularly with reference to the famous final offer of September 2008, shortly before leaving office, and the Palestinian response to it. I think this is something pretty notable that should be included here, or potentially even have its own article. Would welcome any comment from other wikipedians on this

--Tomatoswoop (talk) 01:22, 1 November 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 4 December 2023

Replace 'Qatar's initiative for peace'.

US, Qatari and Egyptian Mediation

On October 7, 2023, thousands of Hamas militants stormed into southern Israel murdering over 1200 Israelis including hundreds of youth at a music festival and families with babies at kibbutzim. They fired thousands of rockets into Israel. They then kidnapped some 240 Israelis including children and held them hostage in Gaza. Israel retaliated with heavy bombardments of the Gaza Strip. On October 9, 2023, Qatari, US and Egyptian mediators began talks with Hamas in an effort to arrange the release of 36 Palestinian women and children from Israeli prisons in exchange for Israeli hostages. Starting from November 24, some 150 Israeli hostages were released in a succession of days in return for a ceasefire and the release of female and teenage Palestinian prisoners. Qatar had been working in collaboration with the United States and Egypt.[21][22] Sandratv99 (talk) 21:00, 4 December 2023 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Shadow311 (talk) 01:16, 6 December 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Undo Dovidroths revert

User Dovidroth reverted my addition. I suggest we undo their revert since my additions made the article more precise. For example, Oslo was specifically an interim agreement aiming for a settlement, not necessarily a Palestinian state. DMH43 (talk) 22:04, 1 January 2024 (UTC)[reply]

It might be worth noting that Dovidroth has been banned from the Palestine/Israel Conflict topic for 90 days: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Dovidroth#Notice_that_you_are_now_subject_to_an_arbitration_enforcement_sanction
this is @Dovidroth's revert DMH43 (talk) 16:59, 2 January 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Neutrality dispute

@DMH223344: Why is this section's neutrality being disputed? Jarble (talk) 22:32, 27 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Some POV issues at a glance:
  • Use of the phrase "destruction of Israel" where it's not appropriate or particularly relevant.
  • "a feeling that Israel offers too little and a mistrust of its actions and motives" makes it seem like deception or perceived deception is a key issue. Also, "offers too little" is an understatement.
  • "The official position of the State of Israel is that peace ought to be negotiated on the basis of giving up some control of the occupied territories in return for a stop to the conflict and violence" is stated without any mention of international law or the international consensus.
  • "Hardliners believe that Israel should annex all Palestinian territory" hardliners should likely be "extremists"
Also, the subsections are confusing as to whether they represent the perspectives of palestinian/israeli people, organizations or causes (it seems to mix all three). DMH223344 (talk) 00:03, 28 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Wrong Security Council resolution

Just noticed in the 2nd paragraph of the lead section it refers to Resolution 388 which is an unrelated resolution relating to Rhodesia. I believe that it should instead be referring to Resolution 338 (not 388) which called for a ceasefire to the Yom Kippur War. Snkn179 (talk) 03:30, 14 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, done. Yr Enw (talk) 05:33, 14 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Out of context Rabin quote

The following quote from Rabin was recently added to the section "Israeli views on the peace process":

I always believed that most of the people want peace and are ready to take a risk for it

This quote belongs in either a hagiographical account, or in a context explaining Rabin's policies towards the peace process. Presented in a quote box, this quote is specifically decontextualized. I propose to remove this quotebox, or move the quote into the body as part of a paragraph which discusses Rabin's policies. DMH223344 (talk) 15:58, 8 May 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Elaboration regarding that demand to recognize Israel as a jewish state

I would suggest the following amendment. Please change X, which is: "In addition, the Israeli government rejected any possible agreement with Palestine as long as it refuses to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s ..." To Y, which is: "In addition, the Israeli government rejected any possible agreement with Palestine as long as it refuses to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

Referring to the issue of recognizing the Jewishness of the State of Israel following Netanyahu's "Bar-Ilan Speech," Abu Mazen warned against presenting a condition for recognizing Israel's Jewish character on the part of the Palestinians. He expressed concern over Netanyahu’s approach of setting "obstructive conditions" ("شروط تعجيزية") of this kind, "which have no basis in the sources of peace authority or international decisions. Although we have already recognized the State of Israel, the demand that we recognize it as a Jewish state is a precondition that cannot be accepted." Abu Mazen explained that accepting the demand would fuel the religious dimension of the conflict (in his words, turn it into a "destructive religious conflict") and endanger the future of Arab Israelis. It also contradicts the logic by which Palestinians receive compensation for the refugee situation. In interviews conducted in 2012 and 2013, Abu Mazen explained that the question of the state's Jewishness is not a matter for the Palestinians, as they are indifferent to how the Jews define their state, and that this is a new condition introduced by Israel. Some argue that the demand for Abu Mazen to recognize Israel as a Jewish state was a "ploy" introduced into the negotiations to sabotage them. Conflict researchers Matti Steinberg and Shaul Arieli explain that this is a demand that is not accepted in international relations, as countries do not typically "recognize" the national character of other countries. They add that there was a legitimate concern on the Palestinian side that the demand could be used to discriminate against Arabs who are Israeli citizens, and that it was perceived as a demand intended to humiliate Abbas. Additionally, Steinberg explains that this demand is absent from the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Jordan, from the negotiations with Syria, and even from the Abraham Accords. Steinberg further explains that from a historical perspective, this is also the traditional position of the right-wing camp in Israel. He cites, for example, Menachem Begin's words (first Israeli Prime Minister from Likud party) in his first speech in the Knesset as Prime Minister, where he said, "We do not expect anyone to request on our behalf that our right to exist in our ancestral homeland be recognized. The only recognition necessary between us and our neighbors is recognition of sovereignty and the mutual need for peaceful and understanding lives." He also mentions Ze'ev Jabotinsky’s stance in his testimony before the Peel Commission: "I do not believe it is desirable for any state’s constitution to contain special clauses that preemptively guarantee its 'national' character... When I use the term 'Hebrew state,' I mean a community or a stretch of land enjoying a sufficient degree of self-governance... and in which there is a Jewish majority." This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s ..."

Sources - 3 books [one of them is an article within a book] by 2 prominent researchers: שאול אריאלי "ככה בדיוק קרה? 12 מיתוסים ישראלים על הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני", ספרי עליית הגג וידיעות ספרים, 2021


מתי שטיינברג ב"על העיוורון: התביעה להכרה ביהודיותה של המדינה כמקרה-מבחן", מתוך 25 שנה לתהליך אוסלו; ציון דרך בניסיונות ליישוב הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני כרמל ירושלים (אפרים לביא, יעל רונן והנרי פישמן עורכים) בעמ' 401-402.


Matti Steinberg, In Search of Modern Palestinian Nationhood The Moshe Dayan Center, Tel-Aviv University (2016) --Amir Segev Sarusi (talk) 14:34, 25 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Not done, It is an unclear edit request that would also require consensus of EC editors. Selfstudier (talk) 15:26, 25 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]
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